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INTRODUCTION
Coal mining is an activity of extreme importance to this
nation. Coal is the dominant energy source for the production
of electricity.' Substantial numbers of persons depend upon
coal production for their livelihood. At the same time, coal
mining has been responsible for some severe disruptions to our
natural and human environments. 2 Federal and state environ-
mental regulations have developed in response to the adverse
effects of coal mining and other natural resource development
activities.3 The current regulations were often adopted only
I In 1986, coal-fired generating plants provided 56% of the electricity generated
in the United States. See Energy Information Agency, MONTHLY ENERGY REVIEW 78
(April, 1987) (table 7.1).
2 Blazey & Strain, Deep Mine Subsidence - State Law and the Federal Response,
1 EASTERN MIN. L. INST. § 1.01[2] (1980).
1 For a concise history of federal environmental regulation of the mining industry
see Manthey, Mining, the Environment, and Government (1883-1983): Environmental
Constraints on Open Pit Mining. 4 EASTERN MIN. L. INST. ch. 3 (1983).
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after bitter and lengthy legislative battles. As the authors of a
timely and excellent treatment of one regulatory effort have
observed: "As public awareness of the environment increased,
the cry for strict regulation of the abusers intensified. Thus,
the time had come to shift the balance of protection from
industrial development to the protection of people and their
property and the preservation of natural resources."
4
Of course, the burden of regulation falls equally on both
the abusers and those who operate with full regard for the
environment and the interests of others. Whenever new regu-
lations make the conduct of an economic activity more diffi-
cult, there are those who assert that the regulations violate one
or more of their constitutionally protected rights. This Article
focuses on the constitutional limits on federal and state regu-
latory power contained in the fifth and fourteenth amendments
to the Constitution and in article I, section 10, the contracts
clause. It examines those limits primarily in terms of the reg-
ulation of coal mining activities which may result in surface
subsidence. It is submitted, however, that the same principles
at work in the subsidence area apply to other regulations af-
fecting coal or other mineral extraction activities.
Subsidence is one of the consequences of the removal of
support from beneath the surface of land. The environmental
consequences of subsidence have been noted by the United
States Supreme Court5 and many commentators. 6 As a natural
4 Hunt & Jones, Subsidence Regulation Under the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1977, 2 J. MIN. L. & POL'Y 63, 66 (1986).
1 In Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987),
the Court stated:
Coal mine subsidence is the lowering of strata overlying a coal mine,
including the land surface, caused by the extraction of underground coal.
This lowering of the strata can have devastating effects. It often causes
substantial damage to foundations, walls, other structural members, and
the integrity of houses and buildings. Subsidence frequently causes sink-
holes on troughs in land which make the land difficult or impossible to
develop. Its effect on farming has been well documented-many subsided
areas cannot be plowed or properly prepared. Subsidence can also cause
the loss of groundwater and surface ponds. In short, it presents the type
of environmental concern that has been the focus of so much federal,
state, and local regulation in recent decades.
Id. at 1236-37.
6 See, e.g., Hunt & Jones, supra note 2, at 76-77; Blazey & Strain, supra note 2.
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phenomenon, one cannot "regulate" coal mine subsidence with
laws any more than King Canute could regulate the tide in the
ancient legend. 7 Therefore, regulation must be directed at those
activities which lead to subsidence and are responsive to legislation.
The United States Supreme Court has recently reviewed the
constitutionality of subsidence regulations imposed by the Com-
monwealth of Pennsylvania in Keystone Bituminous Coal Associa-
tion v. DeBenedictis.' Since this Article focuses upon the power of
government, state and federal, to regulate coal mining activities
which can result in subsidence, it offers a survey of the ana-
lytical tools which courts, particularly the United States Su-
preme Court, use to evaluate the constitutional validity of
these and similar regulations. It also examines the context in
which those tools may be applied to the regulation of mining
activities which can result in subsidence.
One of the reasons for this approach is the similarity in
tests used by courts when reviewing regulations of this nature.
Generally a court will review regulations of economic activity
by a "reasonableness" or "rationality" test. 9 The Supreme
Court is loathe to overturn state or federal economic regula-
tions in facial constitutional challenges' 0 and demands specific
evidence as to how the contested regulation adversely affects
some legitimate interest of the challenger." Unless it can be
shown by sufficient competent evidence that a mining regula-
tion has the effect of prohibiting mining altogether, either by
I Canute was an early Danish King who also became King of England in the
Eleventh Century. According to legend, he sought to persuade his subjects of his limited
powers by commanding the tide to stop. Of course, it did not obey him. BEND, THE
READERS' ENCYCLOPEDIA 165 (2d ed. 1965).
107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987).
See infra notes 53 (Equal Protection), 61 (Due Process) and accompanying text.
,O A facial constitutional challenge is one in which the validity of the regulation
generally is attacked without regard to the application of that regulation to any particular
set of facts. Such a challenge is to be contrasted with an "as applied" challenge, where
the validity of the regulation is tested by its impact upon a particular set of facts.
Compare Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (facial challenge)
with Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928) ("as applied" challenge).
" "[Tlhe constitutionality of statutes ought not be decided except in an actual
factual setting that makes such a decision necessary." Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining
& Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 294-95 (1981).
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denying the right to mine or by making it unprofitable to
exercise that right, a facial attack on the validity of the regu-
lation, unrelated to a specific mining operation is almost cer-
tainly doomed to failure.'
2
I. THE REGULATORY POWER OF GOVERNMENT
A. Sources
The government, whether state or federal, has the power to
regulate private conduct for the protection of the health, safety,
morals, or general welfare of its citizens. 3 The police power of
the states has been termed one of the "most essential powers
of government, one that is the least limitable.' 1 4 So long as a
regulation seeks to promote a legitimate public purpose and is
reasonably related to that end, it will be sustained." Further,
courts will usually accord a police power regulation a strong
presumption of validity, so that a party attacking it on consti-
tutional grounds bears a heavy burden to establish the regula-
tion's invalidity.' 6 Any state statute regulating subsidence effects
of coal or other mining will be tested by this standard.
Congress has directed the Secretary of the Interior, through
the federal Office of Surface Mining (OSM), 17 to regulate sub-
sidence as one of the "surface effects" of underground coal
mining 8 under the federal Surface Mining Control and Recla-
mation Act of 1977 (SMCRA).' 9 The general power of Congress
to regulate in this area under its constitutional power over in-
terstate commerce was sustained in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Min-
12 Id.
11 E.g., Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 136 (1893).
,1 Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915). See, Usery v. Turner Elkhorn
Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976).
" See infra, notes 63-65, 67 and accompanying text.
16 "The burden is on the one attacking the legislative arrangement to negative
every conceivable basis which might support it." Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88
(1940).
" 30 U.S.C. § 1211(c) (1982).
, 30 U.S.C. § 1266(b)(1) (1982).
19 Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-87, §§
101-908, 91 Stat. 445 (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 1201-1328 (1982)).
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ing and Reclamation Association, Inc. 20 Once the subject matter
of the regulation is found to come within the scope of the com-
merce clause, the test of the regulation's validity is essentially the
same as used to test a regulation under the states' police power.2
B. Limitations
It is likely that any challenge to a state or OSM regulation
aimed at reducing or controlling subsidence will be tested by
the same basic constitutional standards. Two provisions of the
federal Constitution limit the regulatory powers of the state
and federal governments, whether the regulation is based upon
the police power or the commerce clause: (1) the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment 22 and (2) the due
process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. 23 In
addition, the contracts clause limits state authority. 24 The fifth
and fourteenth amendment limitations are designed to protect
private persons and their property from unreasonably oppres-
sive government action. The contracts clause comes into play
when an exercise of state power affects rights between private
parties, or between the government and a private party, which
were created by an agreement between those parties.
II. REGULATION OF SUBSIDENCE CAUSING ACTIVITIES
A. Federal Regulations25
Section 516 of SMCRA directs OSM and those states acting
under primacy to require deep coal mine operators to:
adopt measures consistent with known technology in order to
prevent subsidence causing material damage to the extent
452 U.S. 264 (1981).
See, e.g., Id.
See infra notes 58-65 and accompanying text.
2 See infra notes 66-255 and accompanying text.
, See infra notes 256-263 and accompanying text.
' For an excellent comprehensive review of the federal regulatory framework
governing subsidence related activities, see Hunt & Jones, supra note 2.
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technologically and economically feasible, maximize mine sta-
bility, and maintain the value and reasonably foreseeable use
of such surface lands, except in those instances where the
mining technology used requires planned subsidence in a pre-
dictable and controlled manner: Provided, That nothing in
this subsection shall be construed to prohibit the standard
method of room and pillar mining; .... 26
Both the state and federal regulations implementing this
provision can be separated into two general categories. The
first category establishes operational regulations. These include
requiring a permit to conduct underground coal mining activi-
ties, permit application information, and a subsidence control
plan, 27 as well as specific regulations of operations in order to
prevent or minimize the adverse surface effects of subsidence.
2
These operational regulations are similar in nature to regula-
tions of land use and other economic activities. If found to
serve a legitimate governmental purpose, they will likely with-
stand constitutional challenge.
A second category of regulations can be described as com-
pensatory regulations. These require the operator to repair
damage to surface structures and facilities or land as a result
of subsidence from mining, or to compensate the owner there-
fore. 29 The mine operator must "correct any material damage
resulting from subsidence caused to surface lands to the extent
technologically and economically feasible." 30 Subject to the
same technological and economic limitations, the operator must
correct material damage to surface structures and facilities re-
sulting from subsidence, or compensate the owner for the dim-
inution in value resulting from the subsidence "to the extent
required under [applicable provisions of] State law."'" Com-
26 SMCRA § 516(b)(1), 30 U.S.C. § 1266(b)(1) (1982). In addition, the regulatory
agency must suspend underground mining operations where they are found to impose a
threat of imminent danger to the inhabitants of urbanized areas, cities, towns, and
communities. Id.
27 30 C.F.R. § 784.20(a)-(h) (1986) (as amended at 52 FED. REO. 4,867 (1987))
(subsidence control plan).
E.g., 52 FED. REG. 4,867 (1987) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. § 784.20(e)(1))
(backstowing and backfilling of voids).
29 See 30 C.F.R. § 817.121(c) (1986) (as amended at 52 FED. REG. 4,868 (1987)).
30 30 C.F.R. § 817.121(c)(1) (1986).
- 30 C.F.R. § 817.121(c)(2) (1986) (as amended at 52 FED. REG. 4,868 (1987)).
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pensatory regulations present a closer constitutional question,
at least where the party to be compensated, or its predecessor
in title, had released the coal owner or operator from liability
for these very injuries.
The extent of OSM's authority under SMCRA was litigated
in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
before Judge Flannery in a series of proceedings under the
caption, In Re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litiga-
tion.32 On October 1, 1984, Judge Flannery handed down an
opinion which dealt with some of the regulations directed at
subsidence.33
The district court upheld, against the coal industry chal-
lenge, that portion of the regulations which requires an oper-
ator to restore damaged land to its pre-mining capacity, if not
to its pre-mining condition,34 regardless of the operator's re-
sponsibility to do so under state law.33 At the request of envi-
ronmentalist challengers, Judge Flannery remanded, for want
of adequate notice and comment,3 6 regulations requiring an
operator to repair or compensate for material damage to sur-
face structures or facilities only to the extent required by state
law.3 7 The judge expressed no final opinion as to the Secretary's
authority to increase liability for damage to structures beyond
that required by state law.3"
32 Civ. No. 79-1144 (D.D.C. Nov. 1985).
21 E.R.C. 1724 (1984).
30 C.F.R. § 817.121(c)(1) (1986).
" In Re Permanent Surface Mining Regulations Litig., 21 E.R.C. at 1728-29.
16 The federal Administrative Procedure Act requires administrative agencies, in-
cluding OSM to give the public notice of proposed rules and an opportunity to comment
upon them before final adoption. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982). Where the finally adopted rule
will differ substantially from the rule as proposed, the agency must again employ the
notice and comment process before final adoption so as to allow the public and interested
parties an opportunity to comment upon the changed proposal. See generally, PIERCE,
SHAPImO & VERKru, ADm IsTRATrvE LAW AND PROCEss 322-27 (1985).
11 In Re Permanent Surface Mining Regulations Litig., 21 E.R.C. at 1731 (citing
30 C.F.R. § 817.121(c)(2) (1986)).
11 In addition, the district court sustained the requirement of pre-mining notice to
owners and occupants of surface lands which might be affected by subsidence, Id. at
1730 (citing 30 C.F.R. § 817.122 (1986)). The district court also sustained the Secretary's
refusal to mandate replacement of water supplies damaged by subsidence or to require,
as part of the permit application, specific information on the mine roof, coal seam, or
floor strength. Id. at 1731.
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On February 17, 1987, the Secretary promulgated a revised
regulation, following a new notice and comment period,3 9 which
continued to define the operator's liability for damage to pri-
vately owned surface structures and facilities according to state
liability rules.40 In the Secretary's view, the federal regulations
should distinguish between those surface features in which there
is only a private concern and those in which a public concern
exists. State law has traditionally provided contract or tort
remedies for damage to surface structures. 41 Therefore, it would
be "inappropriate . .. to step in and protect owners of these
structures thereby creating an additional private property right
which clearly was not intended by Congress. ' 42 For surface
structures and facilities in which there exists a public, rather
than a purely private interest, protection is provided without
regard to state law.
43
Significantly, Judge Flannery's inquiry in In re Permanent
Surface Mining Regulation Litigation was limited to the Sec-
retary's statutory authority to adopt particular regulations un-
der SMCRA. The constitutionality of any regulation as applied
to a particular mining operation was not before him."4
B. Pennsylvania Regulations
Under SMCRA, states granted enforcement primacy may
impose regulations which are more stringent than those of OSM
and may regulate as they see fit in areas not covered by the
Act. 45 Therefore, primacy states may impose more restrictive
subsidence regulations than the federal regulations. 6
39 52 FED. REG. 4,861 (1987).
, 52 FED. REG. 4,860-4,868 (1987) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. § 817.121(c)(2)).
41 52 FED. REG. 4,864 (1987).
42 Id. (emphasis in original).
41 Id. Underground mining is not permitted beneath or adjacent to public buildings
and facilities, churches, schools, hospitals, and large bodies of water unless the operator
can demonstrate in its permit application that there will be no material damage from
subsidence. Id.
" See In Re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litig., 21 E.R.C. at 1730.
41 SMCRA § 503(a), 30 U.S.C. § 1255(a),(b) (1982).
" A detailed discussion of the federal regulations is beyond the scope of this paper.
However, for an excellent and provocative discussion of their history and uncertain
constitutionality or efficacy, see Ingram, Regulation of Mine Subsidence - Issues Raised
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In 1966, Pennsylvania adopted the Bituminous Coal Mine
Subsidence and Land Conservation Act. 47 Section 4 of the
Subsidence Act prohibits underground mining which will cause
the collapse of the surface beneath certain designated surface
structures and cemeteries in existence on the effective date of
the Act, April 27, 1966.4 The prohibition may be waived if
two conditions are met: (1) the protected structure's owner
consents to the mining and (2) the mine operator repairs any
damage to that structure from subsidence or compensates the
owner for that damage. 49 Section 4, therefore, imposes essen-
tially operational regulations.
Section 6 requires a mine operator whose operations have
caused damage to a protected surface structure to repair the
structure or compensate the owner for the damage.50 If the op-
erator does not correct the damage or compensate the owner
within six months from the date the operator knows or has reason
to know that the damage has occurred, the Pennsylvania Depart-
ment of Environmental Research (DER) must suspend or revoke
the mine permit." To avoid suspension of the permit, the operator
by Government Intervention in Historically Private Arrangements, 5 EASTERN MIN. L.
INST. ch.6 (1984); McGowan, Liability for Surface Structures Under the Federal Surface
Mining Act: The Need for Certainty in the Law and on Review, 5 EASTERN MIN. L.
INST. ch.23 (1984).
- The Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act of 1966, PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1406.1-1406.21 (Purdon Supp. 1987) [hereinafter the Subsidence
Act].
. Section 4 provides:
In order to guard the health, safety and general welfare of the public, no
owner, operator, lessor, lessee, or general manager, superintendent or other
person in charge of having supervision over any bituminous coal mine shall
mine bituminous coal so as to cause damage as a result of the caving-in,
collapse or subsidence of the following surface structures in place on April
27, 1966, overlying or in the proximity of the mine:
(1) Any public building or any noncommerical structure customarily used
by the public, including but not being limited to churches, schools, hos-
pitals, and municipal utilities or municipal public service operations.
(2) Any dwelling used for human habitation; and
(3) Any cemetery or public burial ground; unless the current owner of the
structure consents and the resulting damage is fully repaired or compen-
sated.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1406.4 (Purdon Supp. 1987).
,9 Id.
o PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1406.6(a) (Purdon Supp. 1987).
51 Id.
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may post a bond with the DER to secure payment for the dam-
age.5 2 Section 6 is a purely compensatory regulation.
The DER regulations extend the duty of support to certain
surface features in addition to those specified in Section 4, in-
cluding "impoundments and other bodies of water with a storage
capacity of 20 acre feet or more; . . .aquifers, perennial streams,
and bodies of water which serve as a significant source for a
public water supply; ... [and] coal refuse disposal areas." 53
Subsidence protection is required for these additional surface
features under the OSM Permanent Regulatory Program.
4
As a general rule, the operator is required to leave fifty percent
of the coal in place under a protected surface structure or surface
feature as support.5 Alternative measures may be permitted where
the operator demonstrates that those measures will be at least as
effective in preventing damage from subsidence as the fifty percent
pillar requirement.
5 6
To obtain a permit for underground bituminous coal mining
operations in Pennsylvania, an operator must agree to leave coal
in place underneath protected surface features as part of its
subsidence control plan. By way of illustration, an 1800 square
foot (30 x 60) surface structure over a coal seam 300 feet deep
will be protected by pillars of coal amounting to fifty percent of
the coal in place within an area of more than one acre 300 feet
beneath the structure.
57
52 25 PA. CODE § 89.143 (1986).
53 Id.
- 30 C.F.R. § 817.121(d) (1986).
" 25 PA. CODE § 89.143(b)(3)(i) (1986).
56 Id. at § 89.143(b)(3)(ii) (1986).
1' This is due to the way in which the Regulations define the area beneath the
protected structure or surface feature for which support pillars must be provided. First
a new perimeter around the perimeter of the stucture or surface feature is marked out
fifteen feet from the sides of the structure or surface boundaries of the feature. Then a
line is drawn from this new perimeter, sloping away from the new perimeter at an angle
of fifteen degrees, to the top of the coal seam. The area required to provide support
for the protected structure or surface feature is determined by the intersection of this
angled line with the top of the coal seam. A formula for determining the area within
which pillars must be left for support around a rectangular structure or surface feature
is (15 + L + 15 + 2(tangent 150 X D)) (15 + W + 15 + 2(tangent 15o X 300)),
where L is the length of the structure or surface feature, W is its width, and D is the
distance from the surface to the coal seam. For a protected structure of 1,800 square
feet, having a length of 60 feet and a width of 30 feet, and being 300 feet above the
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III. EQUAL PROTECTION
"[N]o State shall . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws."
' ' 8
Perhaps the easiest limitation to deal with, and to dismiss as
a serious limitation on the government's ability to regulate mining
and require control of the effects of subsidence, is the fourteenth
amendment's equal protection clause. Essentially, this provision
requires that state governments treat like situations alike. 9
Regulations are reviewed under the equal protection standard
by a two or three tiered test, depending upon the person describing
the test and the nature of the interest affected by the regulation. 
°
Regulation of subsidence causing activities are viewed as economic
regulations which do not involve a fundamental interest, suspect
classification, or important governmental interest. 6' Economic reg-
ulations are subject to the first tier, or lowest level of judicial
scrutiny, the "rational basis test." 62
A classification of economic activities will not violate the equal
protection clause if it is "rationally related to the State's [legiti-
mate police power] objective." 6 The Supreme Court, in an equal
protection challenge, will not review the wisdom or efficacy of
the regulation where this reasonable relationship exists:
Social and economic legislation like the [federal] Surface Mining
Act that does not employ suspect classifications or impinge on
fundamental rights must be upheld against equal protection
attack when the legislative means are rationally related to a
coal seam, the formula would give the following result: (15 + 60 + 15 + 2(tangent
150 X 300)) (15 + 30 + 15 + 2(tangent 15* X 300)) = (90 + (2 X 80.38475))(60 +
(2 X 80.38475)) = 55,362.2610 square feet (1.27 acres) at the top of the coal seam. 25
PA. CODE § 89.143(b)(3)(i)(B) (1986).
51 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
,9 The requirement of equal treatment also applies to the federal government as
part of the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954).
61 See NowAK, ROTUNDA & YOUNG, CONSTFrnrION AL LAW 583-94 (1983); Seebur-
ger, The Muddle of the Middle Tier: The Coming Crisis in Equal Protection, 48 Mo.
L. REV. 587 (1983).
61 Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 331-32 (1981).
62 Id.
,1 Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 316 (1976).
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legitimate governmental purpose. [Citations omitted.] Moreover,
such legislation carries with it a presumption of rationality that
can only be overcome by a clear showing of arbitrariness and
irrationality.... [Citations omitted.] [S]ocial and economic leg-
islation is valid unless "the varying treatment of different groups
or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination
of legitimate purposes that [a court] can only conclude that the
legislature's actions were irrational." This is a heavy bur-
den ....
The key to a successful equal protection challenge at this
lowest level of scrutiny, if there is one, lies in the purpose of the
regulation. Is the prevention or minimization of damage from
subsidence, or the compensation of others who have suffered
losses as a result of subsidence, a legitimate governmental pur-
pose? This is also a central issue in any due process or contracts
clause challenge.
65
IV. DUE PROCESS AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
No person shall.., be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation.
6
A. Due Process Requires That the Government Act Reasonably
in the Exercise of Its Powers.
The classic test for evaluating the constitutional validity of an
exercise of the police power was formulated by the Supreme Court
many years ago in Lawton v. Steele:
67
[tlo justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf
of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the
public ... require such interference; and, second, that the
means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.M
Indiana, 452 U.S. at 331-32.
6, For a discussion of the legitimacy of governmental purpose in the regulation of
subsidence causing activities see infra notes 85-91 and accompanying text.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
6 152 U.S. 133 (1894).
" Id. at 137.
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Implicit in this statment are two limitations on any governmental
regulation: (1) the regulation must be intended to accomplish some
legitimate public purpose; and (2) the regulation itself must be
reasonably related to the accomplishment of that purpose, that
is, not arbitrary, capricious, nor "unduly oppressive upon indi-
viduals."
As a general proposition the Supreme Court will defer to the
judgment of the legislature when asked to determine whether or
not a state or federal action serves a public purpose. The Court's
opinion in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,69 contains an
extensive discussion of the role of the judiciary in reviewing
legislative determinations that a particular action serves a public
purpose.70 Essentially, that opinion states that deference is in order
until the legislature's determination "is shown to involve an im-
possibility," 7 or is "palpably without reasonable foundation.' '72
The states have a fundamental interest in the maintenance
of the natural environment. In upholding the power of a state
to sue a private party in another state to abate a nuisance,
Justice Holmes once observed:
The state has an interest independent of and behind the titles
of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain. It has
the last word as to whether its mountains shall be stripped of
their forests and its inhabitants shall breathe pure air. It might
have to pay individuals before it could utter that word, but it
remains the final power. 3
Where the state has identified a public interest in terms of
the health, safety, morals, or general welfare of its citizens, the
Court has generally applied the same sort of "rational relation-
ship" test as found in the equal protection analysis. 74 This rea-
- 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
70 Id. at 239-41.
71 Id. at 240 (quoting Old Dominion Co. v. United States, 269 U.S. 55, 66 (1925)).
7 Id. at 240 (quoting United States v. Gettysburg Elec. R.R. Co., 160 U.S. 668,
690 (1896)).
71 Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907).
74 See supra note 64 and accompanying text. The Court has said that: "[tlhe scope
of the 'public use' requirement [of the takings clause is coterminous with scope of a
sovereign's police powers." Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240. See also Berman v. Parker, 348
U.S. 26, 33 (1954); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1014 (1984).
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soning was used by the Supreme Court to find a sufficient public
purpose to support SMCRA under the commerce clause.
7"
When is a regulation reasonably related to a public purpose?
In the absence of a specific factual challenge, the short answer
to this question is, almost always. The determination that a
particular purpose is a public one is generally left to the legis-
lature. 76 However, the reasonableness of the means employed to
accomplish that purpose may be the subject of judicial review.
In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 77 the Supreme
Court held a California Coastal Commission regulation invalid,
inter alia because it was not reasonably related to the accomplish-
ment of the Commission's asserted public purpose. 7 The Nollans
owned a lot with ocean frontage. The lot was one of several situated
on an inlet. Public parks were located on either end of the inlet.
The public had the right to pass along the foreshore between
the private lots and the ocean. 79 To increase public access to the
ocean and foreshore, and between the two parks, the Commis-
sion adopted a policy of requiring the ocean frontage private lot
owners to dedicate a public easement on a portion of their lots
parallel to the shoreline. The dedication requirement was to be
imposed whenever a lot owner sought Commission approval to
alter or improve the lot. When the Nollans sought Commission
approval to remove the summer cottage on their lot and replace
it with a much larger permanent home, the Commission condi-
tioned its permit upon dedication of the necessary easement. The
Nollans proceeded to contest the easement condition in court
and to construct the larger home. 0
Justice Scalia, writing for the five member majority of the
Court, struck down the dedication requirement for several rea-
sons. One of the reasons for invalidating the requirement was
that it did not bear a sufficiently close relationship to the purpose
of increasing access to the shore and the property between the
- See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n Inc., 452 U.S. 264,
280-83 (1982).
716 See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
11 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
78 Id.
79 Id. at 3143.
80 Id.
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public parks.8' Nollan indicates that, while the Court will defer
to legislative judgments on the question of what is a public
purpose, it will examine the relationship between the means
chosen to accomplish that purpose and the purpose itself more
closely .82 Where the means are irrational, arbitrary, capricious,
or not sufficiently related to the accomplishment of the public
purpose, the regulation will be stricken.
The operational regulations83 of underground coal mining
are intended to preserve the public's interest in the natural
environment and other public values.84 They will be found to
promote public purposes in most instances unless they can be
shown to be so difficult to satisfy that they will result in a total
prohibition' of underground mining or to render mining unprof-
itable.85 Even then, the regulations may be upheld if mining
would constitute an unreasonable activity when weighed against
other, competing activities, i.e., if the mining activity could be
characterized as a public nuisance.
8 6
The compensatory regulations 7 stand on a somewhat differ-
ent footing. It is more difficult to see how they serve to promote
public interests. Judge Flannery reasoned that the requirement
of restoring unimproved surface land served the public interest
in environmental preservation and protection 8 The Secretary of
the Interior has indicated that there is a federal public interest
in assuring the restoration of unimproved land to its pre-mining
capacity independent of any contract between the landowner and
the mine operator.89 The Secretary found no similar federal
interest in compensating private persons for damages to struc-
tures resulting from subsidence. 90 These persons may have rem-
edies under local law through actions for removal of subjacent
" Id. at 3148.
82 Id. at 3148-50.
" See supra note 27, 28 and accompanying text.
SMCRA § 101-102, 30 U.S.C. § 1201 (1982); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1406.1
(Purdon Supp. 1987).
' See infra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232, 1244-46
(1987).
82 See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
In re Permanent Surface Mining Litig., 21 E.R.C. 1724, 1729 (D.D.C. 1984).
52 FED. REG. 4,863 (1987).
SId.
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support or for mine operator negligence. Or, as is often the
case, surface owners, or others in their chain of title, may have
waived any right to recover for injuries of this nature.9'
B. Property and the Fifth Amendment
1. The "Takings" Clause Limits the Police Power
An economic regulation will be found to be unreasonable if
it operates to deny an owner all economic use of its property.
92
If the regulation were allowed to stand, the government would
have effectively acquired the owner's right to use its private
property for the government's own benefit. While the acquisition
may be permissible, fifth amendment due process requires that
the government compensate the owner under the just compen-
sation clause. 93
The Subsidence Act was not Pennsylvania's first attempt to
regulate coal mining activities which could damage surface struc-
tures. In 1921, the legislature adopted a statute, popularly known
as the Kohler Act, prohibiting the mining of anthracite coal
which could cause subsidence under certain surface structures,
including single family residences. 94 That statute was held to be
unconstitutional in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.9
Mr. and Mrs. Mahon sought to enjoin the coal company
from mining beneath their land in a manner which could cause
damage to their home. Mrs. Mahon's father had acquired the
land from the coal company, built the house on it, and upon
his death, devised the land and house to Mrs. Mahon. She had
conveyed it to herself and her husband as tenants by the en-
91 52 FED. REG. 4,863-64 (1987).
- See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); Nectow v. City of
Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928) (zoning ordinance arbitrary as applied); Armstrong v.
United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960) (materialmens' liens on ships built under government
contract in default); Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980)
(State not entitled to interest on funds deposited with court in receivership proceeding).
9 E.g., Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
" PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 661-71 (Purdon 1966). In 1961, the same statute, with
the addition of a statement of purpose in section 672.1(a), was otherwise reenacted
verbatim. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 672.1-.10 (Purdon 1966).
95 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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tirety.9 In the deed to Mrs. Mahon's father, the coal company
had expressly excepted and reserved "all coal and other minerals
under, in or upon said lot of land" with all mining rights. 97 In
addition, the deed specifically provided that "said Pennsylvania
Coal Company ... [is] not to be liable to the said [Grantee],
his heirs or assigns to or for any injury or damages that may
occur by reason of mining or removing said coal or other min-
erals .... *"98 Under Pennsylvania law, this deed severed the coal
company's former estate into three distinct estates in land: (1)
an estate in the coal and other minerals, now held by the coal
company; (2) a separate estate in the right of support normally
owed the surface by the mineral estate, now also held by the
coal company; and (3) an estate in the surface and other portions
of the land not encompassed within the mineral and support
estates, eventually held by Mr. and Mrs. Mahon.9
It was common in Pennsylvania for the owner of the coal
to retain or acquire, upon severance of the surface and mineral
estates, the estate in support as well. Mining operations then
could proceed without concern for surface activities. The Kohler
Act represented a legislative attempt to provide protection for
certain designated surface activities, including residences, public
buildings, public roads, and cemeteries. 10 However, mining which
would injure a designated activity was permitted where the coal
owner also owned the surface on which the activity was con-
ducted. 101
' Record at 6, Pennsylvania Coal.
97 Record at 7, Pennsylvania Coal. For more on the factual setting of this case,
see Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL.
L. REv. 561, 563-64 (1984).
Record at 7, Pennsylvania Coal.
9' See, e.g., Smith v. Glen Alden Coal Co., 347 Pa. 290, 32 A.2d 227 (1943);
Charnetski v. Miners Mill Coal Mining Co., 270 Pa. 459, 113 A. 683 (1921); Penman
v. Jones, 256 Pa. 416, 100 A. 1043 (1917). This peculiarity of Pennsylvania property
law has been severely criticized. See Montgomary, The Development of the Right of
Subjacent Support and the "Third Estate" in Pennsylvania, 25 TEMP. L.Q. 1 (1951).
However, the concept retains its vitality in the eyes of the Pennsylvania courts. Captline
v. Allegheny County, 74 Pa. Commw. 85, 459 A.2d 1298 (1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S.
904 (1984).
"W PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 661 (Purdon 1966). There is a remarkable similarity
between the structures protected by the Kohler Act and those protected by the Subsidence
Act. See supra note 47.
'0' PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 666 (Purdon 1966).
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The United States Supreme Court, in the famous majority
opinion by Justice Holmes, held the Kohler Act to be an uncon-
stitutional regulation of private property; it denied the coal
company all use of its estate in support. 02 This was the equiv-
alent of a taking of the coal company's support estate without
compensation. Justice Holmes saw this legislation as an exercise
of police power which, if sustained, would have effectively elim-
inated the value of the coal company's estate in support. The
practical consequences would have been a transfer of the coal
company's estate in support to the Mahons without compensat-
ing the coal company. In Pennsylvania the estate in support was
an estate in land as surely as the estate in the surface and the
estate in the coal.
Pennsylvania Coal contains Justice Holmes's famous quo-
tation upon which subsequent courts and commentators'03 have
tried to build a takings jurisprudence: "The general rule at least
is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."'
4
The constitutional flaw in the Kohler Act was not that it
attempted to protect surface land from injury caused by subsid-
ence. It did not do this; it specifically allowed mining where the
surface would collapse regardless of the activities occurring there
if the surface and the coal estates were owned by the same
person. 0 5 Nor was the flaw that the Act might require that coal
be left unmined as an incident of a police power regulation. The
Supreme Court a few years earlier had sustained a Pennsylvania
statute requiring that a certain amount of coal be left unmined
on both sides of a common boundary with another mine, despite
similar fifth and fourteenth amendment arguments.'06
10, Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 414.
103 The articles which appear to have had an impact on the present Court in the
takings area are Michaelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967) and Sax,
Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 30 (1964).
1o Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415. See also McGinley & Barrett, Pennsylvania
Coal Company v. Mahon, Revisited: Is the Federal Surface Mining Act a Valid Exercise
of the Police Power or an Unconstitutional Taking?, 16 TULSA L.J. 418, 429-31, 442-43
(1981).
'0' PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 666 (Purdon 1966).
- Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 531 (1914).
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The fatal flaw of the Kohler Act was that it prohibited
mining altogether in certain places. This prohibition not only
eliminated the value of the coal company's estate in support, it
also eliminated the value of its coal estate: "What makes the
right to mine coal valuable is that it can be exercised with profit.
To make it commercially impracticable to mine certain coal has
very nearly the same effect for constitutional purposes as appro-
priating or destroying it."1°7
In his opinion, Justice Holmes dismissed the asserted public
purpose for the statute with the following observation: "[s]o far
as private persons or communities have seen fit to take the risk
of acquiring only surface rights, we cannot see that the fact that
their risk has become a danger warrants the giving to them of
greater rights than they bought."' 0
Preservation of public interests in the surface of land, and
in water supplies which may be affected by subsidence, are
legitimate public purposes. Requiring that some pillars of coal
be left to protect those public interests may be a legitimate means
of accomplishing that purpose. However, where the regulation
is intended to benefit particular private persons, or the govern-
ment in its proprietary capacity as a landowner (e.g., public
buildings and roads), rather than the public at large, at the sole
1w Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 414.
"0 Id. at 416. Earlier in the opinion, Justice Holmes stated:
This is the case of a single private house. No doubt there is a public
interest even in this, as there is in every purchase and sale and in all that
happens within the commonwealth. Some existing rights may be modified
even in such a case. But usually in ordinary private affairs the public
interest does not warrant much of this kind of interference. A source of
damage to such a house is not a public nuisance even if similar damage is
inflicted upon others in different places. The damage is not common or
public. The extent of the public interest is shown by the statute to be
limited since the statute ordinarily does not apply when the surface is
owned by the owner of the coal .... On the other hand the extent of the
taking is great. It purports to abolish what is recognized in Pennsylvania
as an estate in land-a very valuable estate-and what is declared by the
Court below to be a contract hitherto binding the plaintiffs. If we were
called upon to deal with the plaintiffs' position alone we should think it
clear that the statute does not disclose a public interest sufficient to warrant
so extensive a destruction of the defendant's constitutionally protected
rights.
Id. at 413-14 (citations omitted).
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expense of some other private party, it becomes arbitrary, ca-
pricious, and "unduly oppressive" to do so without compensat-
ing that other party. Here was the Kohler Act's Achilles' heel.1° 9
At least after the Court's 1984 decision in Midkiff, one could
conclude that Pennsylvania could have acquired the support
estate beneath the Mahon's house by eminent domain, compen-
sated the coal company, and transferred the support estate to
the Mahons. This taking could have served a legitimate public
purpose. Midkiff upheld the compensated taking of title to land
from owners of large Hawaiian estates for the purpose of trans-
ferring the title to residential tenants when certain statutory
conditions had been met. The Court said that the State of Hawaii
was free to alter its land tenure system to encourage more
diversified ownership if the state legislature regarded that as a
proper public purpose, provided that the state compensated those
private owners whose property rights were ended." 0
2. Drawing the Line Between Regulation and Eminent
Domain
The question becomes one of which tool-the police power
or the power of eminent domain-is constitutionally mandated
to achieve a particular public purpose. Pennsylvania Coal"' tells
us that when the regulation goes too far, the government must
use eminent domain." 2 If it does not provide compensation, the
regulation will fail for want of constitutionally required due
process. Pennsylvania Coal did not, however, tell us how far is
"too far". This should not surprise any close reader of Justice
Holmes's opinions. He was not reluctant to draw lines in particular
cases, even if he could not or would not articulate just where
the line should be drawn in some other, similar, but not iden-
tical, case.
1a See, e.g., Webb, 449 U.S. 155 (1980); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256
(1946).
"o Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 243 ("Redistribution of fees simple to correct deficiencies
in the market determined by the state legislature to be attributable to land oligopoly is
a rational exercise of the eminent domain power.").
1" 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
112 Id. at 415.
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Although Justice Holmes provided no clear description of
the line between regulation and takings, he did state the method
by which the Court still tests individual cases:
All rights tend to declare themselves absolute to their logical
extreme. Yet all in fact are limited by the neighborhood of
principles of policy which are other than those on which the
particular right is founded, and which become strong enough
to hold their own when a certain point is reached. The limits
set to property by other public interests present themselves as
a branch of what is called the police power of the State. The
boundary at which the conflicting interests balance cannot be
determined by any general formula in advance, but points in
the line, or helping to establish it, are fixed by decisions that
this or that concrete case falls on the nearer or farther side.
For instance, the police power may limit the height of build-
ings, in a city, without compensation. To that extent it cuts
down on what otherwise would be the rights of property. But
if it should attempt to limit the height so far as to make an
ordinary building lot wholly useless, the rights of property
would prevail over the other public interests, and the police
power would fail. To set such a limit would need compen-
sation and the power of eminent domain." 3
To Justice Holmes, the Kohler Act made the coal company's
"building lot"-its estate in support-"wholly useless." In his
view, "[t]o set such a limit would need compensation and the
power of eminent domain."
'" 4
The Supreme Court has consistently refused to indicate where
the line between legitimate regulation and actions requiring com-
pensation lies." 5 Indeed, one of the leading commentators in
"I Hudson Valley Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908) (emphasis
added).
114 Id.
"I Hodel v. Irving, 107 S. Ct. 2076, 2082 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n.
v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232, 1242 (1987); McDonald, Sommers & Frattes v. Yolo
County, 106 S. Ct. 2561, 2566 (1986); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986,
1005 (1984); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n., 452 U.S. 264, 295
(1982); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260-61 (1980); Kaiser Aetna v. United
States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979); Penn-Central
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); Armstrong v. United
States, 364 U.S. 40, 48 (1960); Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 416; Hudson Valley
Water, 209 U.S. at 355.
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this area has said that the efforts to develop any satisfactory
criteria for drawing the line between "regulation" and "eminent
domain" is "the most haunting jurisprudential problem in the
field of contemporary land use law . .. one that may be the
lawyer's equivalent of the physicist's search for the quark."
'" 6
Pennsylvania Coal established the "too far" test for govern-
ment regulation of private property interests. Where a regulation
goes so far as to deprive the owner of all beneficial use and
enjoyment of its property right, the regulation will be found to
be invalid as having gone "too far"."7 While Justice Holmes
and subsequent legal writers have phrased this question in terms
of a governmental regulation amounting to a "taking," and
thus, as invalid unless the owner is compensated for the loss,
Justice Holmes did not actually invoke the just compensation
clause of the fifth amendment in Pennsylvania Coal. Rather,
his opinion should be read as establishing a test of regulatory
reasonableness; a substantive due process test of governmental
regulations. Where the regulation goes so far as to deny the
property owner constitutionally protected rights, the regulation
is arbitrary, capricious, and "unduly oppressive upon
individuals""' unless the property owner is compensated for the
loss of its constitutionally protected rights. Just compensation
will relieve the "unduly oppressive" effect of the government's
action where that action otherwise accomplishes a public pur-
pose. 119
Since Pennsylvania Coal, the Court has also indicated that
the takings clause of the fifth amendment was intended to pre-
vent the government from unfairly casting the burden of achiev-
ing public benefits on a few individuals. "IT]he Fifth
Amendment's guarantee . . . was designed to bar Government
from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which,
11 C. HAAR, LAND-USE PLANNING 766 (3d ed. 1977). See also Berger, A Policy
Analysis of the Taking Problem, 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 165 (1974); Michaelman, supra
note 97; Sax, supra note 103.
117 Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415.
"I Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894).
119"[Olne fact for consideration in determining [the limits of the police power]
... is the extent of the diminution in value [of the affected property]. When it reaches
a certain magnitude, in most if not all cases, there must be an exercise of eminent
domain and compensation to sustain the act." Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413.
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in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole.' 120 The concept of "fairness and justice" is one of due
process. 121
Opinions of the Court, particularly those in the last decade,
can be helpful in determining where the line will be drawn in
particular cases, if not in drawing the line in general.
The leading case in attempting to explain what the Court
termed "taking jurisprudence" is Penn-Central Transportation Co.
v. New York City.12 2 The owner of Grand Central Station unsuc-
cessfuly challenged the City's refusal to approve an addition
above the existing station structure under its Landmark Preser-
vation Law. 2 1 Penn-Central claimed that the refusal amounted
to an invalid taking of property because it was denied the value
of the addition within private property (air space) which it
owned. The challenge failed because a majority of the Court
concluded that, based upon the record before it, there was no
showing that Penn-Central could not receive a fair economic
return on its investment, 2 4 or that it could not utilize the air
space for some other addition which the City might approve.
25
Justice Brennan, for the majority, undertook an extensive
review of the Court's prior cases in an attempt to provide
guidance as to when a regulation might be so unduly oppressive
as to amount to a taking. 126 Rejecting any single test, he con-
cluded that the "takings analysis" is "essentially an ad hoc,
factual inquir[y].' ' 2 7 The factors which play a particularly sig-
nificant role in determining whether a public purpose must be
accomplished by eminent domain or through regulation are: (1)
"[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and,
particularly the extent to which the regulation has interfered
with distinct investment-backed expectations" and (2) "the char-
acter of the governmental action." 128
n2 Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49.
12 Id. See also Rochin v. California, 341 U.S. 165, 169 (1952) and cases cited
therein.
' 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
I ld. at 107.
Id. at 136.
125 Id.
I d. at 123-28.
Id. at 124.
121 Penn-Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
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The Court's later opinions have sometimes reversed the order
of these factors, emphasizing the character of the governmental
action first and then examining the economic impact of that
action on the private owner's reasonable investment-backed ex-
pectations.129 In at least one case, Justice White described these
as three independent factors. 30 In any event, it appears as if the
character of the governmental action can be determinative of
whether a "taking" has occurred without regard to the economic
impact of that action on the owner or its interference with the
owner's reasonable investment-backed expectations.'
a. The Character of the Governmental Action.
In all cases, governmental action must be intended to accom-
plish some legitimate purpose. But that is not enough to sustain
the action as an exercise of the police power rather than an
exercise of the power of eminent domain. Both powers must be
exercised for a public purpose. The character of the action may
be "invasive" if it allows the government, the public, or other
private parties, to enjoy a private owner's property without that
owner's consent. Governmental action which results in a direct
appropriation of all of the value of private property for the
benefit of the government or of other private parties will be
valid only if accompanied by just compensation.1 2 If a private
0
" "The Court, however, has identifed several factors that should be taken into
account when determining whether a governmental action has gone beyond 'regulation',
and effects a 'taking'. Among those factors are: 'the character of the governmental
action, its economic impact, and its interference with reasonable investment-backed
expectations.' " Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984) (quoting
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980)).
30 "To aid in this determination, however, we have identified three factors which
have 'particular significance:' " (1) 'the economic impact of regulation on the claimant';
(2) 'the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed
expectations'; and (3) 'the character of the governmental action'." Connolly v. Pension
Benefit Guar. Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1018, 1026 (1987) (citing Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. 986).
3 E.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
,' Hodel v. Irving, 107 S. Ct. 2076 (1987) (statute prohibiting transfer by devise
or descent of small fractional interests in Indian lands with interest escheating to Tribe instead
held unconstitutional); Loretto, 458 U.S. 419. (state regulation requiring apartment building
owners to permit cable television operators use of owners' buildings and land for access
to tenants without compensation violates Fifth Amendment Takings requirement); Webb's
Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980) (state not entitled to interest
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property owner has been required to surrender full control and
dominion over its property, the government action has "gone
too far" to be a noncompensable excercise of the police power.'
By the same token, if the consequence of the governmental
action has been to permit the public to make use of the holder's
property without its consent, the action requires an exercise of
eminent domain.' 34 In the above situations, fhere has been a
direct appropriation or physical invasion of private property.
The character of these actions is "invasive". They amount to
"takings" and compensation is required in the interest of "fair-
ness and justice," i.e., as a matter of due process, under the
fifth amendment.
b. The Economic Impact of the Governmental Action on the
Claimant.
To determine whether compensation will be required to sup-
port an exercise of government power which is not "invasive"
in the traditional sense, it is necessary to examine the action's
impact on the holder of affected private property rights. Where
the character of the action is to adjust "the benefits and burdens
of economic life to promote the public good," regulation will
more likely survive a "takings" challenge.' 35 As Justice Holmes
observed in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon: 3 6 "[g]overnment
could hartily go on if to some extent values incident to property
could not be diminished without paying for every such change.'
' 37
or funds deposited with court in receivership proceedings); Kaiser Aetna v. United States,
444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979) (federal navigation servitude may not be imposed on private
marina connected to ocean by private parties); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256
(1946) (invasion of private airspace by military airplane overflights); Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922); United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (1903)
(flooding of private land by federal project).
,3' First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los An-
geles, 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987) (temporary flood protection ordinance alleged to prohibit
all use of private property); Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960) (government
contract enforcement action purported to extinguish liens for material and labor);
Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. 383 (1922).
3 Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984); Loretto, 458 U.S. 419;
Webb, 449 U.S. 155; Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. 164; Causby, 328 U.S. 256.
135 Sax, supra note 103.
'16 260 U.S. 393.
I Id. 260 U.S. at 413.
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A regulation which is found to promote the general welfare
in a reasonable manner will be sustained even though it dimin-
ishes the value of private property,3 8 or reduces the rights for-
merly available to the private owner,3 9 or totally destroys some,
but not all, property values.' 40 The question, since Pennsylvania
Coal, has always been, how far may the government go in
diminishing private property values before the action will be held
to be a taking. Presently, the Court addresses that question in
the context of the private owner's "reasonable investment-backed
expectations." 141
c. The Governmental Action's Interference with Reasonable
Investment-Backed Expectations.
The economic impact factor has sometimes been described
as the "diminution in value theory."1 42 Yet regulations which
have caused substantial diminution in the present value of private
property have been upheld against "takings" challenges.
43
The diminution in value of one's private property rights has
certainly played a role in the Court's decisions.'" The Court will
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (zoning); Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (zoning); Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927)
(set backs); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (prohibition of brickyard in
particular section of city).
,,9 PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (state law prohibiting
owners of shopping center from excluding solicitation of signatures for political petition
not unreasonable and not a taking of owners' protected property right to exclude
undesirables); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979) (federal prohibition against sale of
artifacts containing eagle feathers acquired prior to enactment of the legislation not a
taking of all property rights in the artifacts).
', Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1982) (state could order destruction of orna-
mental trees to prevent spread of disease dangerous to commerical apple trees).
141 See infra notes 142-76 and accompanying text.
,4' E.g., McGinley & Barrett, supra note 104, at 435-37; Berger, supra note 116,
at 275-77.
"4 See e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S 394 (1915) (8807o diminution); Village
of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (7507o diminution).
I" In certain cases, the Court has emphasized that the private owner had been
totally deprived of its property interest by the government's actions. See e.g., First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct. 2378
(1987); Hodel v. Irving, 107 S. Ct. 2076 (1987); Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S.
40 (1960); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). See also Kaiser Aetna
v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (marina owners would have been totally denied
their "right to exclude others" if the federal navigational servitude had been allowed);
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examine the effect of the regulation upon the challenger's private
property rights and balance that effect against the public values
to be protected by the regulation. 145 Where the owner is unable
to show that the regulation works a total deprivation of the
value of its property, the owner is unlikely to prevail.
A prime example is the case of Goldblatt v. Town of Hemp-
stead.1 4 6 Mr. Goldblatt had been operating a sand and gravel
quarry on his land for a long time when the Town passed an
ordinance prohibiting all quarrying below the water table.
1 47
Goldblatt's quarry had been operating below the water table for
at least 20 years, 48 but, the Court sustained the ordinance be-
cause the owner had not proven that the land had no economic
use if quarrying were not permitted. ' 49 The ordinance was found
to serve a substantial public safety purpose.5 0
The same basic fact situation was present in Penn-Central
Transportation Co. v. City of New York.' The company did not
demonstrate that it was unable to obtain .a reasonable economic
return on its investment in the station without the particular
addition which it sought.5 2 The Penn-Central majority com-
mented upon Goldblatt as follows: "[i]t is, of course, implicit
in Goldblatt that a use restriction on real property may constitute
a 'taking' if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a
substantial public purpose, or perhaps if it has an unduly harsh
impact upon the owner's use of the property."'5
Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979) (One of the few property rights left to the owner
of the eagle feathers was the right to exclude others.). But see PruneYard Shopping
Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 84 (1980) (Shopping center owners "failed to demonstrate
that 'the right to exclude others' is so essential to the use or economic value of their
property that the state-authorized limitation of it amounted to a 'taking.' ").
"I See cases cited, supra note 144, especially PruneYard Shopping Center, 447 U.S.
at 83.
-- 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
147 Id. at 592.
I Id. at 591.
141 Id. at 592.
1o Id. at 595-96.
438 U.S. 104 (1978).
152 Id. at 137.
Id. at 127 (citations omitted). The Court has said that a land use regulation can
effect a taking if it "does not substantially advance legitimate state interests, or denies
an owner economically viable use of his land." Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260
(1980) (citations omitted).
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The question of "reasonable investment-backed expecta-
tions" was the focus of the Court's inquiry in Webb's Fabulous
Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith154 and Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto
Co.' In Webb, the Court held unconstitutional a Florida statute
permitting the government to retain interest earned on funds
paid into court in a state receivership proceeding.'56 The state
failed to provide any justification for retaining the funds in
question. The statute amounted to an appropriation of property
which should have been available either to the debtor or to its
creditors. 7
In Ruckelshaus, the use and disclosure of certain trade secrets
and other information supplied to the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) incident to registration under the Federal Insec-
ticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act 158 of active ingredients in
pesticides, was alleged to constitute a taking of the company's
property interests in the information. At different times, due to
different amendments to FIFRA, the EPA's use of the data in
evaluating applications submitted by others and its authority to
disclose data to persons requesting it was subject to different
limitations. 5 9 While conceding that Monsanto had a constitu-
tionally protected properfy interest in its trade secrets,160 a unan-
imous Court held that the EPA was entitled to disclose or use
information in accordance with the representations of confiden-
tiality contained in FIFRA at the time that information was
submitted to it.161 Any disclosure or use which was inconsistent
with those representations could entitle Monsanto to compen-
-- 449 U.S. 155 (1980).
" 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
449 U.S. at 164.
Id. at 163-64.
7 U.S.C. §§ 135-36y (1982) (hereinafter FIFRA).
Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 994-97.
60 Monsanto's claim to trade secret protection was recognized as a property right
under Missouri state law and was, therefore, entitled to federal constitutional protection
under the fifth amendment. "In answering the question now, we are mindful of the
basic axiom that '[piroperty interests . . . are not created by the Constitution. Rather
they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules and understandings
that stem from an independent source, such as state law.' " Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. 986,
1001 (1984) (quoting Webb, 449 U.S. at 161 (quoting Roth v. Board of Regents, 408
U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).
16 Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1020.
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sation for a taking of its property. "A 'reasonable investment-
backed expectation' must be more than a 'unilateral expectation
or an abstract need'.' 1 62 The company's expectations of protec-
tion for its information was "reasonable" only when the statute
indicated that use or disclosure would not be permitted, or
permitted only under certain circumstances. The statute defined
what expectations of an applicant for registration were reason-
able in the context of the regulation.
163
In Kaiser Aetna v. United States,'6 private owners had in-
vested substantial sums to improve an inland pond and connect
it with the ocean so as to make it navigable; they paid fees to
"maintain the privacy and security of the pond."' 65 The char-
acter of the governmental action-assertion of the federal navi-
gation servitude with attendant public navigational rights within
the pond-amounted to a physical invasion of their property.
The Court noted that to have enforced the federal navigation
servitude in the pond would have required admission of the
public against the wishes (and the reasonable investment-backed
expectations) of the private owners. 66
A private owner's expectations are not necessarily determi-
native of what "investment-backed expectations" are "reason-
able". For example, in Andrus v. Allard,'6 7 the owners of certain
Native American artifacts containing eagle feathers attacked fed-
eral regulations prohibiting the sale, inter alia, of bald eagle
feathers or parts and of articles containing bald eagle feathers
or parts. 68 The plaintiffs asserted that enforcement of the pro-
hibition against the sale of artifacts existing before any pro-
tective legislation had been adopted would not serve a legitimate
purpose and would amount to a taking of their property in the
artifacts, i.e., their right to sell them.
169
Id. at 1005-06 (quoting Webb, 449 U.S. at 161).
I ld. at 1006.
" 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
165 Id. at 168.
i6 Id. at 180. See PruneYard, 444 U.S. at 84 (explaining Kaiser Aetna).
l6 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
16 U.S.C. § 668(a) (1982) ("eagle protection act"); 16 U.S.C. § 703 (1982)
(Migratory Bird Treaty Act).
10 Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 56.
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The Court rejected these arguments. With respect to the
taking issue, the Court held that an owner's "property" con-
sisted of a "bundle of rights".' 7 One "strand" in that "bundle"
was the right to sell the artifacts. 171 While this "strand" may
now be denied the owners, they retained sufficient other
"strands" in their "bundle" of ownership rights that no taking
of property was effected by the statutes. 72 The owners retained
the right, among others, to exclude the rest of the world from
the artifacts. This right left them with a reasonable use of the
artifacts, the right to display them and to charge admission to
see them.1
73
In PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins,174 a state statute
gave persons the right to enter upon privately-owned shopping
centers at reasonable times and under reasonable conditions to
solicit signatures for an election petition. 75 The statute thus
limited the shopping center owner's right to exclude persons not
of its choosing. In this regard it was similar to what would have
been the consequence of enforcing the federal navigation servi-
tude in Kaiser Aetna. Unlike Kaiser Aetna, however, the statute
did not impair the reasonable economic value of the shopping
center. Therefore, it did not interfere with the owner's legitimate
investment backed expectations and did not amount to a taking
of private property. 
76
3. The Takings Clause and Keystone Bituminous Coal
Association v. DeBenedictis.1
77
In Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis, 171
the Supreme Court was faced with the need to reconsider its decision
in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon179 and was given the oppor-
170 Id. at 66.
" Id.
,72 Id.
171 Id. at 65-67.
-1- 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
.75 Id.
176 Id. at 83.
17 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987), aff'g Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. Duncan, 771
F.2d 707 (3rd Cir. 1985), and Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 581 F.
Supp. 511 (W.D. Pa. 1984).
0U Id.
," 260 U.S. .393 (1922).
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tunity to squarely overrule that troublesome decision. Instead of
overruling Pennsylvania Coal, the Court reaffirmed its commit-
ment to the proposition that a regulation of private property
which "goes too far" will be invalid unless the owner is com-
pensated for its loss.s° By a vote of five to four, the Court
sustained Pennsylvania's Subsidence Act against fifth amend-
ment takings clause and contracts clause challenges.'
The Association and several of its members, mine owners
and mine operators in western Pennsylvania, began this civil
rights action in the district court to challenge the Subsidence Act
and the DER's implementing regulations on both facial and "as
applied" grounds. The district court upheld the facial validity
of the Act on cross motions for summary judgment. 1 2 At the
request of the parties, the district judge certified the facial con-
stitutional questions to the court of appeals, which also upheld
the facial validity of the Act and regulations."i 3 The Supreme
Court granted the plaintiff's petition for certiorari and affirmed
the judgments below.
a. Pennsylvania Coal and Keystone Distinguished.
It was necessary for the majority to distinguish Keystone
from Pennsylvania Coal.Is4 This it did in two ways. First, the
majority treated Pennsylvania Coal as an "as applied challenge"
to the Kohler Act and Keystone as a facial challenge to the
11o Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1253.
The Keystone Court stated:
The two factors that the Court [in Pennsylvania Coal] considered relevant,
have become integral parts of our takings analysis. We have held that land
use regulation can effect a taking if it "does not substantially advance
legitimate state interests . . . or denies an owner economically viable use
of his land."
Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1242 (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion for himself and Justices Brennan, White,
Marshall, and Blackmun. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote a dissenting opinion in which
Justices Powell, O'Connor, and Scalia joined.
"I Keystone, 581 F. Supp. 511 (W.D. Pa. 1984). The "as applied" challenge is
still pending before the district court.
"s Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. Duncan, 771 F.2d 707 (3rd Cir. 1985).
"' For a discussion Pennsylvania Coal, see supra notes 95-109 and accompanying
text.
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Subsidence Act.' 5 Second, it found that the Subsidence Act,
unlike the Kohler Act, served a significant public purpose.
8 6
(i) Facial vs. "As Applied" Challenges - The Burden of Proof
of Invalidity.
To establish the "as applied" nature of the Pennsylvania
Coal decision, the majority relied upon coal company allegations
in its Petition to Advance Argument that it and other local
mining companies were totally unable to mine coal as a conse-
quence of the Kohler Act.8 7 In Keystone, the parties had stip-
ulated that some 27 million tons of coal might have to be left
unmined to comply with the Subsidence Act.188 However, the
petitioners did not claim that any of their coal mines would be
unprofitable because of the Subsidence Act,18 9 nor did they show
that the 27 million tons of coal necessarily would have been
mined without the Act.' 9° Therefore, the majority turned its
attention to the facial validity of the Subsidence Act. A facial
challenge imposes a heavy burden on the challenger to establish
the constitutional invalidity of a police power measure.19'
(ii) The Public Interest to Be Protected.
In Pennsylvania Coal, Justice Holmes suggested that the
Kohler Act was designed primarily to serve private rather than
public interests. 92 The Subsidence Act contains a legislative state-
ment of purpose which identifies the public interests to be served
115 See infra notes 187-91 and accompanying text.
86 See infra notes 192-99 and accompanying text.
Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1242.
Id. at 1249.
189 Id. at 1248.
19 Id.
191 See id. at 1247-48. The Keystone Court stated:
Petitioners thus face an uphill battle in making a facial attack on the Act
as a taking. The hill is made especially steep because petitioners have not
claimed, at this stage, that the Act makes it commercially impracticable
for them to continue mining their bituminous coal interests in western
Pennsylvania. Indeed, petitioners have not even pointed to a single mine
that can no longer be mined for profit.
Id.
192 Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415.
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by regulating underground coal mining activities so as to mini-
mize surface damage from mine subsidence. 93 The Keystone
majority seized upon this statement of purpose to distinguish
the two statutes.
Unlike the Kohler Act, which was passed upon in Pennsylvania
Coal, the Subsidence Act does not merely involve a balancing
of the private economic interests of coal companies against the
private interests of the surface owners. The Pennsylvania Leg-
islature specifically found that important public interests are
served by enforcing a policy that is designed to minimize
subsidence in certain areas. 94
The majority also rejected the Association's argument that
Section 6 of the Subsidence Act, requiring repair of or compen-
sation for damage to protected surface structures, was intended
to further private rather than public interests. 95 Imposing finan-
cial responsibility on the mine operator serves to encourage
mining in a manner which minimizes subsidence damage.' 96 Mini-
mizing damage from subsidence is the state's objective. The
court stated:
Thus, the Subsidence Act differs from the Kohler Act in critical
and dispositive respects. With regard to the Kohler Act, the
191 The Subsidence Act provides:
This act shall be deemed to be an exercise of the police powers of the
Commonwealth for the protection of the health, safety and general welfare
of the people of the Commonwealth, by providing for the conservation of
surface land areas which may be affected by the mining of bituminous
coal . . ., to aid in the protection of the safety of the public, to enhance
the value of such lands for taxation, to aid in the preservation of surface
water drainage and public water supplies and generally to improve the use
and enjoyment of such lands....
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1406.2 (Purdon Supp. 1987).
1 Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1242 (quoting PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1406.2 (Purdon
Supp. 1987)) (Subsidence Act statement of purpose). While the Kohler Act contained a
preamble setting forth some similar legislative purposes, preambles were not considered
an organic part of the statute at that time. "Because of its position preceding the
enacting clause, it has often been said that material in the preamble not having been
'enacted,' cannot be given any binding legal effect." 2A SUTHn.AM STATUTORY CON-
STRUCTION § 47.04 (4th ed. 1984).
Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1243.
" Id.
1987] CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON COAL MINING REGULATIONS 35
Court believed that the Commonwealth had acted only to
ensure against damage to some private landowners' homes....
Here, by contrast, the Commonwealth is acting to protect the
public interest in health, the environment, and the fiscal integ-
rity of the area. That private individuals erred in taking a risk
cannot stop the State from exercising its police power to abate
activity akin to a public nuisance. The Subsidence Act is a
prime example that "circumstances may so change in time...
as to clothe with such a [public] interest what at other times
. ..would be a matter of purely private concern."' 
97
The quoted language from Block v. Hirsh'9s may be a tacit
admission by Justice Stevens that Pennsylvania Coal and Key-
stone are not as readily distinguished as the majority would
wish. Nevertheless, the majority found sufficient reasons for
distinguishing the two cases without the need to overrule Penn-
sylvania Coal.199
b. The Impact of the Subsidence Act on the Petitioner's Prop-
erty Rights.
Having established that the Subsidence Act advances legiti-
mate public interests, the majority next examined the impact of
the Act on the petitioner's property to determine the character
of the governmental action. 200 Did it authorize an invasion of
the petitioner's property by the public or amount to an uncom-
pensated appropriation of their property? Did it so reduce the
' Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1243 (quoting Block 256 U.S. at 155).
256 U.S. 155 (1921).
9' In addressing the takings issue, the majority opinion contains a lengthy discus-
sion of governmental ability to protect public interests through the police power by
abating public nuisances without having to compensate the owner of the nuisance for
any loss. Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1244-46. The opinion at least implies that the state
might regulate subsidence as a noxious use. However, Justice Stevens concludes this
discussion with the observation that there are other grounds for finding that the Subsid-
ence Act does not work a taking: "Nonetheless, we need not rest our decision on this
factor alone, because petitioners have also failed to make a showing of diminution of
value sufficient to satisfy the test set forth in Pennsylvania Coal and our other regulatory
takings cases." Id. at 1246. Thus, this portion of the opinion may be obiter dictum.
Id. at 1248.
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private value of their property that interests of fairness and
justice required compensation for the action to be valid? 20'
This step in the analysis requires the parties and the court
to identify the unit of property or the property interest the
diminution in value of which is to be measured. 20 2 The petitioners
asserted that the Act worked a taking of two property interests:
(1) their property right to the coal which would have to be left
in place to support protected surface structures and features, 203
and (2) their support estates. 2°4 The majority refused to recognize
either interest as the relevant parcel for purposes of measuring
the diminution in value effected by the Subsidence Act.
20
,
(i) The Coal in Place.
In Pennsylvania Coal, Justice Holmes said: "[W]hat makes
the right to mine coal valuable is that it can be exercised with
profit. To make it commercially impracticable to mine certain
coal has very nearly the same effect for constitutional purposes
as appropriating or destroying it. ' '2° The petitioners in Keystone
asserted that the DER's implementation of Section 4 of the
Subsidence Act, by requiring fifty percent of the coal be left in
place under protected structures and surface features, made it
commercially impractical to mine 27 million tons of coal in
thirteen mines. 2°7
According to the Keystone majority, Justice Holmes was
referring to the coal company's allegation of its general inability
to mine due to the Kohler Act, not its inability to mine the
support pillars which might have to be left in the ground. 20 8 The
Keystone Court found no need to focus on individual coal pillars
in evaluating the regulatory impact on the petitioners' prop-
", "The Fifth Amendment's guarantee . .. was designed to bar Government from
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole." Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,
49 (1960).
2w Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1248.
201 Id. at 1249.
Id. at 1250.
20 Id. at 1249, 1250.
Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 414 (emphasis added).
10 Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1249.
m Id.
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erty. 2°9 The pillars are analogous to the unimproved areas of
individual surface parcels under set-back and yard requirements
of zoning and other land use ordinances. In the case of these
well-recognized police power regulations, the relevant parcel is
the total lot, not the undevelopable portion. The unit of property
on which the Subsidence Act's impact should be measured is the
coal in the mine or, more accurately, the amount of coal which
can profitably be mined from the operation after giving effect
to the regulation.
Justice Stevens pointed out that these 27 million tons were
less than two percent of the total 1.46 billion tons of coal
reserves within the thirteen mines. 210 Not all of the 1.46 billion
tons could have been mined had the Subsidence Act not been
adopted.21' The record failed to indicate how much of the 27
million tons could have been mined without the restrictions of
the Subsidence Act. Petitioners did not allege that any of their
operations had been rendered unprofitable because of the Section
4 support requirements. Thus, there simply was no evidence that
the requirement of leaving fifty percent of the coal in place
under protected surface features prevented profitable mining
operations.212
The majority's definition of the unit for takings evaluation
purposes raises a question for the future. When advance mining
"The 27 million tons of coal [required to be left in place] do not constitute a
separate segment of property for takings law purposes." Id. at 1249. See also Penn-
Central Transpt. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130 (1978) (" 'Taking'
jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to
determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated.").
"I Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1249.
211 Id.
212
When the coal that must remain beneath the ground is viewed in the
context of any reasonable unit of petitioners' coal mining operations and
financial-backed expectations, it is plain that petitioners have not come
close to satisfying their burden of proving that they have been denied the
economically viable use of that property. The record indicates that only
about 755 of petitioners' underground coal can be profitably mined in any
event, and there is no showing that petitioners' reasonable "investment-
backed expectations" have been materially affected by the additional duty
to retain the small percentage that must be used to support the structures
protected by section 4.
Id. at 1249-50.
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has been completed and the operator determines, in good faith
and exercising good mining practices, to engage in retreat mining
and the removal of pillars, 2 3 can the operator compare the
mine's then current reserve base before and after the Subsidence
Act's support requirements to determine whether the Act has
gone "too far"? Presumably, the operator's "reasonable invest-
ment-backed expectations" would be defined by the anticipated
profitability at the earlier of the time when mining began or
when the regulation took effect. 21 4 If so, the reserve base of the
mine at that time would constitute the appropriate unit of prop-
erty for the takings analysis.
(ii) The Support Estate.
The Keystone majority refused to treat the support estate as
a separate property unit for takings analysis purposes: "[o]ur
takings jurisprudence forecloses reliance on such legalistic dis-
tinctions within a bundle of property rights. ' 2 5 Asserting that
the lower court was "more familiar with Pennsylvania law than
we are, ' 21 6 the majority relied upon the analysis of the court of
appeals for its conclusion that the support estate was only a
"strand" in the "bundle of rights" of either the mineral estate
or the surface estate and not a separate estate in its own right.
21 7
"I "Retreat" mining occurs after mining to the end of the recoverable coal seam.
During the initial mining process, blocks or pillars of coal will be left as a matter of
course to provide roof support for the protection of the miners and their machinery.
Upon reaching the end of the seam, the operation will begin to return to the point of
entry. At this time, the blocks of coal left for roof support can be removed as the
operations "retreat" to the mine entry.
"I See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
25 Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1250.
216 Id.
217
Thus, in practical terms, the support estate has value only insofar as it
protects or enhances the value of the estate with which it is associated. Its
value is merely a part of the entire bundle of rights possessed by the owner
of either the coal or the surface. Because petitioners retain the right to
mine virtually all of the coal in their mineral estates, the burden of the
Act placed on the support estate does not constitute a taking. Petitioners
may continue to mine coal profitably even if they may not destroy or
damage surface structures at will in the process.
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The court of appeals had engaged in a pragmatic rather than
conceptual analysis of the support estate. It concluded that this
estate had value only to the holder of the mineral estate or to
the holder of the surface estate as these were the only persons
who could "use" the support estate. 2 8 Therefore, the unit of
property for purposes of the takings analysis was the Association
members' mineral estates, not just their support estates.
The majority's discussion of the support estate is not con-
vincing. It relies upon a misreading of Pennsylvania law and a
misinterpretation of the Court's own precedents. The Court has
always looked to state law to define units of property. 2 9 The
Pennsylvania courts, as recently as 1985, have described the
support right as an estate in land.
220
Penn-Central and Allard,221 the cases relied upon for treating
the rights alleged to have been taken as parts of larger units of
property which had retained substantial value after application
of the contested regulation, did not involve claims that separately
defined property estates had been "taken." 2 2 In Penn-Central,
it is true, the plaintiff sought to have its right to develop the air
space above its existing terminal valued as a separate unit of
property. 223 The Court refused to do so because the plaintiff
also owned the land and building beneath the air space. 224 The
Court did not rule on the right of only an air rights owner to
make reasonable economic use of that air space. In Allard, the
plaintiff asserted that the prohibition on sale itself was a taking
of a valuable property right, not of all its rights in the artifacts.
225
As in Penn-Central, the Court focused on the value of the rights
221 Id. (quoting Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. Duncan, 771 F.2d 707, 715-16
(3d Cir. 1985)).
29 "Property interests ... are not created by the Constitution. Rather they are
created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules and understandings that stem
from an independent source such as state law .. " Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564, 577 (1972). See also Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. 986, 1001 (1984); and Webb's Fabulous
Pharmacies Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980).
1 Captline v. Allegheny County, 74 Pa. Commw. 85, 459 A.2d 1298 (1983), cert.
denied, 466 U.S. 904 (1984).
221 444 U.S. 65 (1979).
Penn-Central, 438 U.S. at 130-31; Allard, 444 U.S. at 67-68.
' Penn-Central, 438 U.S. 104-05.
Id. at 105.
Allard, 444 U.S. at 65-66.
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retained by the plaintiff. 226 Yet, Section 4 of the Subsidence Act
totally prohibits use of the support estate beneath protected
surface structures and surface features by anyone other than the
owner of the surface estate.
227
A more satisfactory analysis offered by the majority rests
upon the nature of the petitioners' challenge to the Subsidence
Act. Here again, the facial nature of the challenge proved fatal
to the petitioners. There was no evidence before the Court of
the extent to which petitioners' support estate under any surface
parcel or for any mine had been reduced in value by the require-
ments of Section 4.221 It appears that there can be no taking of
private property without a showing of severe (pehaps total) diminu-
tion in value, or of an invasion by the public, or of an appropriation
to public use.
c. Keystone Bituminous Coal Association - Dissent.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, took a different ap-
proach. In his view, the Keystone case was indistinguishable
from Pennsylvania Coal.229 The dissenting opinion begins with a
disavowal of Justice Stevens's description of most of the lan-
guage in Pennsylvania Coal as "uncharacteristically . . .advi-
sory." ' 23 0 In Chief Justice Rehnquist's view, the entire
Pennsylvania Coal opinion has become "a cornerstone of jur-
isprudence of the Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation
Clause."
23 '
The dissenters agree with the majority that the Subsidence
Act "serves a public interest," and would constitute a public
purpose.232 However, they see the same public interest as that
set out in the Kohler Act and rely, in part, upon the preamble
and on the operation of that statute. 233 The dissenting opinion
also points to the similarity in the operation of the two statutes:
2' Id. at 66.
227 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1406.4 (Purdon Supp. 1987).
Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1248.
2" Id. at 1253.
2M Id.
23 Id. at 1254.
21 Id. at 1255.
233 Id.
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"it is clear that the Court has severely understated the similarity
of purpose between the Subsidence Act and the Kohler Act. The
public purposes in this case are not sufficient to distinguish it
from Pennsylvania Coal."
23 4
The dissenting opinion does not, however, discuss the dif-
ference in the implementation of the two Acts. According to the
majority, the allegations in Pennsylvania Coal were that mining
was impossible if the Kohler Act requirements were enforced. 235
Under the DER's regulations implementing the Subsidence Act,
mining remains possible. It is only necessary to leave fifty per-
cent of the coal in place under protected surface features.
23 6
Chief Justice Rehnquist did not acknowledge, let alone discuss,
this potentially significant distinction. Nor does he discuss the
fact that the Subsidence Act prohibits mining causing subsidence
without regard to surface ownership, whereas the Kohler Act
protected the integrity of the surface only when the surface and
mineral estates were in separate ownership.
23 7
Chief Justice Rehnquist, in a footnote, made a most signif-
icant observation concerning statutes which serve a public pur-
pose.238 He approved of the propositions that deference to a
legislative determination of public purpose is appropriate and
that the Court should not concern itself with the wisdom or
effectiveness of the legislation to accomplish that purpose.
23 9
However, he pointed out that the existence of a public purpose,
while a necessary condition for government action, is not a
sufficient condition to support that action as a regulation instead
of a taking. 24° Deference to the legislature's determination of
114 Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1255. The dissent takes issue with the majority's
discussion of nuisance based regulation. While recognizing that there may be some
"nuisance" exception to the takings clause, Chief Justice Rehnquist denies that the
exception applies where an owner is denied all use of its property. He accuses the
majority of an overly broad application of the "nuisance" rationale. Id. at 1256.
235 Id. at 1249.
236 See supra notes 55 and 56 and accompanying text.
233 It should be noted that while the Subsidence Act does not prohibit mining which
will result in subsidence if the surface owner consents, that consent does not relieve the
operator of its duty to repair or compensate for any damage. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §
1406.4 (Purdon Supp. 1987).
13 Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1255-56 n.3.
239 Id.
m Id.
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public purpose does not require deference to the legislature's
choice of means to accomplish that purpose. As he stated: "[o]ur
cases have never found it sufficient that legislation efficiently
achieves its desired objectives to hold that the compensation
required by the Fifth Amendment is unavailable."
24
1
The dissenters were obviously impressed by the sheer quantity
of coal which the parties had stipulated would remain in the
ground. Chief Justice Rehnquist observed that the "petitioners'
interests in particular coal deposits have been completely de-
stroyed. By requiring that the defined seams of coal remain in
the ground, . . . the Subsidence Act has extinguished any interest
one might want to acquire in this property, for 'the right to coal
consists in the right to mine it.' ",242 This statement misreads the
Subsidence Act and implementing regulations. Nowhere does the
Act require a "seam" be left unmined; only those portions of
a seam within a defined subterranean area must be left to protect
particular surface features, in a manner similar to the require-
ment of side, front, and rear yards under a zoning ordinance.
243
The dissent makes its most persuasive argument when defin-
ing the relevent parcel for applying the diminution in value
test. The dissenting opinion began with the proposition that
the property should be identified according to what the private
owner has lost as a result of the regulation rather than what the
government has gained.2" The petitioners had lost approximately
27 million tons of coal which they could not mine.245 Chief
Justice Rehnquist stated, "Itihere is no question that this coal
is an identifiable and separable property interest." 24 He pointed
out that the "bundle" of rights in coal is not as large as in the
surface, relying yet another time on Justice Holme's statement
that, "for practical purposes, the right to coal consists in the
right to mine it." 241 In Chief Justice Rehnquist's view, the Sub-
sidence Act's implementing regulations completely prevent the
vi Id.
2 Id. at 1257 (citation omitted).
'3 See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1406.1-.21 (Purdon Supp. 1987).
Keystone, 107 S.Ct. at 1257.
Id. at 1258.
Id. at 1259.
247 Id. (citations omitted).
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mining of this coal in place. 24 To that extent, the Subsidence
Act should be regarded as working a taking.
Petitioners in Keystone were not denied the right to mine all
of the coal that they own, only the right to mine that portion
necessary to support the protected surface structures and surface
features of public importance. Under Chief Justice Rehnquist's
reasoning in the case of Ambler Realty Co. v. Village of Eu-
clid,249 the Ambler Realty Company should have attacked the
zoning ordinance of the Village of Euclid on the basis that the
property owners within the Village had lost X thousand acres of
land due to the front, side, and rear yard requirements of the
zoning ordinance.
The most important difference between the majority and the
dissent appears with respect to their treatment of the support
estate. Chief Justice Rehnquist pointed out that the Court, prior
to Keystone, had always employed state law to determine the
relevant parcel for purposes of the diminution in value test.
250
Inasmuch as Pennsylvania had defined the support estate as a
separate estate in property, the appropriate analysis should have
focused upon this estate, and not its relationship or value to the
mineral or surface estates. "In these circumstances, where the
estate defined by state law is both severable and of value in its
own right, it is appropriate to consider the effect of the regu-
lation on that particular property interest." 25' The imposition of
strict liability on the mine operator for damage to protected
surface features under Section 6 of the Subsidence Act "extin-
guishes the petitioners' interest in their support estates, making
worthless what they purchased as a separate right under Penn-
sylvania law." 252
d. Conclusion.
By defining the relevant parcel for takings purposes as the
coal reserves owned by the petitioners, rather than by either the
coal which the Subsidence Act will require to remain in place
2" Id.
272 U.S. 365 (1926).
Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1260.
I ld.
252 Id.
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after mining or the support estate, the majority was able to
sustain the Act against petitioners' facial fifth amendment tak-
ings clause challenge. At the same time, the majority was able
to avoid overruling or modifying the holding of Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon .211 It is still possible for a regulation to go
"too far" to be sustained as an exercise of the the police power
without compensation.2 5 4 Had petitioners been able to establish
that the Subsidence Act made their mining operations unprofit-
able, the majority indicates that, absent a conclusion that un-
derground mining was a public nuisance, the Act would have
failed the "too far" test.
255
V. THE CONTRACTS CLAUSE
"No state shall . . . pass any . . . law impairing the obli-
gation of contracts. "256
The contracts clause is one of the few expressed limitations
upon the power of the states contained in the federal Constitu-
tion. It does not apply to actions of the federal government.
257
The contracts clause only operates as a limitation on a state law
which will affect contract rights already in existence at the time
the law is enacted. 2 8 It has long been recognized "that a law
does not impair the obligations of contracts if it merely prevents
an obligation from arising in the first place.
' 259
The petitioners in Keystone asserted that the repair or com-
pensate provisions of Section 6 of the Subsidence Act nullified
their contract rights with surface owners who had waived any
25 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
E.g., First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los
Angeles, 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987) (decided after Keystone) (allowing recovery of compen-
sation for a regulation denying all use of property, even if the regulation is temporary
in nature, unless the state can show that prohibited uses would have been a public
nuisance).
251 Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232, 1247-48
(1987).
U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
"' Pension Benefit Guarantee Corp. v. R. A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S 717 (1984).
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right to recover for subsidence damage. 26° These waivers usually
accompanied the support estate. 26' The petitioners argued that
to the extent that the Subsidence Act required them to compen-
sate a surface owner who had waived the right to recover for
this very injury, petitioners' contractual rights were totally de-
stroyed.262
Justice Stevens pointed out that the Court had long ago
established that "the prohibition against impairing the obligation
of contracts is not to be read literally. '263 Relying heavily upon
recent divided decisions by the Court,26 he proceeded to set
forth, in perhaps the clearest terms to date, the appropriate
analysis for assessing allegations that a state statute has violated
the contracts clause by impairing contractual obligations of
private parties.
This analysis requires a court, first, to identify the precise
contractual right which is alleged to have been impaired and the
nature of the impairment. 265 Second, if the statute operates as a
substantial impairment of contractual rights or obligations, the
court should examine the state's asserted purpose or justification
for that impairment. 26 The degree of impairment will affect the
extent of scrutiny of the state's justification. The greater the
degree of impairment, the more closely the court must examine
the justification for the impairment. 267 However, the examining
court should defer to the state on the question of whether the
impairment serves a public purpose. 268 This point is important.
While the determination of whether the statute serves a public
purpose is for the state legislature, the adequacy of the justification
260 Keystone, 107 S.Ct. at 1251.
' For a discussion of the waiver of liability in Pennsylvania Coal, see supra note
97. Waivers of liability for damage from mine subsidence have been held to be covenants
running with the respective estates in Pennsylvania where the appropriate requirements
had been met. Kormuth v. United States Steel Co., 379 Pa. 365, 108 A.2d 907 (1954).
Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1236.
Id. at 1251 (citing W.B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426, 433 (1934)).
26, Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1251-52.
26 Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1252.
w Id. at 1252-53.
Id. at 1253.
2M Id.
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of the impairment is for the reviewing court.269
Finally, a significant and legitimate public purpose is a nec-
essary, but not a sufficient reason for sustaining a statute which
impairs private contractual rights or obligations. The legislative
adjustment of the contracting parties' rights must also be (1)
based upon reasonable conditions and (2) of a character appro-
priate to the asserted public purpose.
270
The Keystone majority found that the public purpose of the
Subsidence Act, as declared by the Pennsylvania legislature, was
"to deter mining practices that could have severe effects on the
surface.' 27 1 This purpose justified the total impairment by Sec-
tion 6 of petitioners' private contract rights with respect to
liability for damage to protected surface structures. 272 By impos-
ing a duty on the operator to repair damage caused by subsidence
or to provide the surface owner with funds to repair that dam-
age, Pennsylvania would accomplish two objectives: (1) the po-
tential for liability would serve to deter mining in a manner that
would cause damage; and (2) to the extent that damage did
occur and was repaired, the restoration of the environment to
its pre-mining condition would be achieved. 271 Whether or not
this was the most appropriate way of preventing and repairing
damage was a matter for the legislature and not the Court to
decide.274
Because he would have found the Subsidence Act invalid
under the takings clause of the fifth amendment, Chief Justice
Rehnquist found no need to discuss the contracts clause issue in
his dissent. 275
Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. at 412-13.
2o Unless the state itself is a party to the contract being impaired, the Court will
defer to the legislative judgment for guidance in determining the necessity for and
reasonableness of that impairment. See id. at 413; United States Trust Co. v. New
Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 23 (1977). Although the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and various
of its municipalities receive protection from Sections 4 and 6 of the Subsidence Act for
various public structures and other facilities, the Court refused to evaluate the impact
of the contracts clause on their particular interests because the petitioners had failed to
raise that issue below. Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1253.
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VI. THE FUTURE OF MINING REGULATION
A. The Requirement of a Public Purpose and the Relationship
of the Regulation to the Accomplishment of That Purpose.
The Supreme Court indicated in Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission 176 that, while it will defer to legislative determinations
of what constitutes a public purpose, it reserves the right to
determine whether a particular regulation is, in fact, reasonably
related to the accomplishment of a legislatively determined public
purpose. 277 Where the regulation is not sufficiently reasonably
related to a public purpose, the regulation will be stricken on
fifth amendment due process grounds. The support and repair/
compensation provisions of the Subsidence Act survived this
examination, at least for a majority of the present Court. Whether
other regulations of mineral exploration and development will
also survive remains to be seen.
SMCRA requires that an operator establish its right to con-
duct surface mining activities on the site prior to obtaining a
permit. 278 Where the mineral and surface estates have been sev-
ered, the application must contain either the written consent of
the surface owner or proof that the applicant holds the right,
expressly or by implication, under state law. 279 The Supreme
Court of Montana recently held unconstitutional Montana's re-
quirement that the applicant submit written consent of the sur-
face owner in order to obtain a surface mining permit. 280 The
court found that the requirement served no public purpose and
thus, was invalid under the Montana Constitution. 28' The Mon-
tana statute required the written consent of the surface owner
to conduct surface mining operations even where that owner, or
some predecessor in title, had already expressly granted the right
276 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
217 See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
278 SMCRA § 510(b), 30 U.S.C. § 1260(b) (1982).
V1 SMCRA § 510(b)(6), 30 U.S.C. § 1260(b)(6) (1982); 30 C.F.R. § 778.15(b)
(1986).
m8 Western Energy Co. v. Genie Land Co., 737 P.2d 478 (Mont. 1987) (holding
unconstitutional MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-4-244 (1986)).
22 Id. at 481.
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to conduct surface mining operations to the applicant. 28 2 The
consent was limited to the surface mining activity. 28 3 The decision
is consistent with Nollan's rule that a police power regulation
must be substantially related to the accomplishment of some
public purpose.
214
Other states impose broader consent requirements which
should survive scrutiny under the Nollan test. For example,
Pennsylvania requires the current surface owner to consent, not
only to entry for mining by the applicant, but also to entry by
the Commonwealth and the operator for purposes of inspection
as the mining operation progresses and to perform post-mining
environmental reclamation work where necessary for up to five
years after mining has ended. 28 5 Here the consent serves public
goals of environmental protection and restoration.
B. Takings Challenges.
Where a state or federal regulation of mining activity (or
any other legitimate economic activity) totally prohibits the en-
joyment of the mineral estate through extraction of the minerals
by the owner of that estate, there will be a taking of the mineral
estate and the owner will be entitled to just compensation for
the value of that estate.2 6 It should not matter whether the
regulation is phrased as an outright prohibition of mining or is
one which so burdens the mining operation as to make it un-
profitable.
2 7
"Unprofitability" is a dangerous term to use in describing
the impact of a regulation. The "profitability" of a mining
M" MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-4-224 (1986).
283 Id.
See supra note 77 and accompanying text; see also Department for Nat'l Re-
sources & Env'! Protection v. No. 8 Ltd. of Va., 528 S.W.2d 684 (Ky. 1975); Comment,
A Constitutional Analysis of the Surface Owner Consent Provisions in the Tennessee
Surface Mining Law and the West Virginia Oil and Gas Conservation Act, 82 W. VA.
L. REv. 1385 (1980).
' PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1396.4(a)(2)F (Purdon Supp. 1987).
21 First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los An-
geles, 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987); Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); Pennsylvania
Coal, 260 U.S. 393, 415. It should, however, be noted that both First Lutheran and
Keystone indicates that there is no constitutionally protected right under the fifth or
fourteenth Amendments to conduct an activity which constitutes a nuisance.
7 See Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1242.
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operation should not be determined by the ability of a particular
plaintiff to operate the enterprise as regulated at a profit. Rather,
the issue should be examined in terms of the ability of a hypo-
thetical prudent mine operator to produce coal at a reasonable
profit under the restrictions of the governmental action in ques-
tion.28 In other words, a properly crafted regulation designed
to serve a legitimate public purpose should not fail simply be-
cause of the ineptitude of the particular owner or operator whose
property is being regulated.
Based on the majority's treatment of the support estate in
Keystone, however, a most important factor in determining the
impact of the governmental action will be the unit of property
chosen as the basis for measuring the extent of diminution in
value after the regulation becomes effective. 2 9 Where the mineral
estate has been held in separate ownership from the surface
estate, since before the regulation was adopted, that mineral
estate should be the controlling unit. Where, however, the min-
eral estate has not been severed from the surface estate, the
controlling unit should be the combined estates. If the surface
estate can be put to reasonable use, a restriction on mining by
one who owns both estates would not result in a sufficient
diminution in value of that person's "property" to constitute a
taking. 29°
Keystone also indicates that the unit of property to be ex-
amined should not be just that portion directly affected by the
governmental action. 291 It will be necessary to examine the impact
of that action on the totality of the mining operation. 292 In
Keystone, this was the entire reserve base of each mine, not just
the pillars of coal required to be left for support.
293
C. The Contracts Clause.
The Keystone majority's contracts clause analysis may prove
to have more significant implications for the mineral industry in
I" See FCC v. Florida Power Corp., 107 S. Ct. 1107 (1987) (rate regulation which
allows for recovery of "fully allocated costs" of activity does not amount to a taking).
n9 Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1239-40. See also text accompanying supra notes 206-
14 and 242-49.
-" See, e.g., Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
291 See Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1248.
292 Id.
293 Id.
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the long run than its takings analysis. This portion of the case
held that a state statute which alters the standard of a mine
operator's liability to the surface owner can serve a public pur-
pose. 294 Where the statute does serve that purpose, the contracts
clause does not prevent operation of the statute even in the face
of existing contractually binding waivers of liability from the
surface owner.
295
To date, at least four states have enacted surface damage
acts requiring mineral developers to compensate surface owners
for damages caused by the development of oil and gas depos-
its.296 The common law of these states traditionally allowed
surface owners to recover for damage caused by drilling opera-
tions under negligence or nuisance theories. The surface damage
acts, however, supplant the common law liability by creating a
strict liability standard for the mineral developers. If the surface
is damaged by any mining operations, no matter how carefully
conducted, the developer must compensate the surface owner
for the damage.
The statutes of Montana, North Dakota, and South Dakota
each begin with legislative findings that invoke the necessity of
exercising the state's police power to protect surface owners from
the development of oil and gas reserves. 297 Each notes the im-
portance to the public welfare of the state of agriculture and the
interference with agriculture that exploration and development
of oil and gas reserves causes. Since protecting the economic
well-being of those engaged in agricultural production serves a
public purpose, the stated purpose of the acts is to provide "the
maximum amount of constitutionally permitted protection to
surface owners from the undesirable effects of mineral devel-
opment." 298 This determination of public purpose would appear
Id. at 1252-53.
29 Id.
"9 See MONT. CODE ANN. §8 82-10-501 to 82-10-511 (1985) (oil and gas operations);
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 38-18-01 to 38-18-08 (Supp. 1985) (coal operations); OKLA. STATS.
ANN. tit. 52 §§ 318.2-.9 (West Supp. 1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 45-5A-2 to
45-5A-11 (1983).
m MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-10-501 (1985); N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-18-01 (Supp.
1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 45-5A-1,-2 (1983).
m9 E.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 45-5A-2 (1983).
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to satisfy the Keystone majority's requirement for a statute
which impairs contractual obligations.
299
CONCLUSION
It is not enough that the legislature determine that a partic-
ular objective is in the public interest. It must employ means
reasonably tailored to accomplish that objective. Those means
may not impact unfairly on individuals. However, where the
means are reasonably related to the objective, and the owner of
the regulated property remains able to make some reasonable
economic use of that property, the regulation should pass federal
constitutional muster.
See Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1262 n.9.

